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ON THIN AIR:  STANDING, CLIMATE 
CHANGE, AND THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
Kevin T. Haroff* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Considerable attention has been given to the growth in litigation 
relating to the causes and consequences of global climate change.1  Much 
of that attention has focused on litigation centering on the authority of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions under the Federal Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”).2  The most notable of these cases is Massachusetts v. EPA,3 in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the EPA has authority under 
the CAA to regulate vehicle tailpipe emissions of GHGs.4  More recently, 
the focus has shifted to cases in which governmental and private party 
plaintiffs have brought climate change-related claims based on common 
law nuisance theories; however, as a general matter, these cases tend to 
                                                 
* Kevin T. Haroff (B.A., College of Arts & Sciences, Cornell University, 1977; J.D., 
Cornell Law School, 1981; M.B.A., Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell 
University, 1981) is a partner in the San Francisco, California office of Marten Law PLLC.  
The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Jared Palmer (B.A., Bowdoin 
College, 2006; J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of Law, 2012) who 
performed legal research for this Article. 
1 See MARK FULTON ET AL., GROWTH OF U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION:  TRENDS & 
CONSEQUENCES  (2010), available at http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/EN/_media/US_CC_ 
Litigation.pdf; see also John Schwartz, Courts as Battlefields in Climate Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2010, at A1 (discussing climate change cases in the federal courts). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7626 (2006). 
3 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
4 The Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA was limited to section 202(a)(1) of the CAA 
and the EPA’s regulation of GHG emissions from mobile sources; however, the decision 
suggested that the federal government also has the authority to regulate GHG emissions 
from stationary sources, like coal-fired electrical generation units (“EGUs”).  Id. at 528–29.  
In Coke Oven Environmental Taskforce v. EPA, ten states, two cities, and three environmental 
groups challenged EPA’s refusal to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants 
under EPA regulations governing stationary sources.  Petition for Review, Coke Oven 
Envtl. Taskforce v. EPA, No. 06-1149 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2006).  The court subsequently 
remanded the matter to the EPA for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.  New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) 
(order remanding in light of new case law).  In December 2010, the parties entered into a 
settlement agreement that required the EPA to promulgate GHG standards of performance 
for new and modified Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (“EGUs”) by May 26, 2012.  
New York v. EPA Settlement Agreement, available at http://www.epa.gov/airquality/ 
pdfs/boilerghgsettlement.pdf. 
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get dismissed on grounds that the claims asserted raise non-justiciable 
political questions or are preempted by the EPA’s regulatory powers.5 
Less attention has been given to climate change litigation brought 
under the first and arguably most wide-ranging of modern U.S. 
environmental laws:  the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(“NEPA”).6  NEPA is the principal federal statute that reflects the 
country’s priorities for protecting the natural environment from 
degradation by humans.  Congress declared that “it is the continuing 
policy of the [f]ederal [g]overnment . . . to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and 
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future 
generations of Americans.”7  Congress also directed the federal 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs cannot proceed because they have no standing and 
because of the political question doctrine); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06–
05755MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (explaining why the political 
question doctrine is a bar to these types of suits); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-
CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing on political 
question grounds); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the 
original action brought under the federal common law of nuisance or, in the alternative, 
state nuisance law, to compel various electric power utilities to cap and then reduce their 
GHG emissions); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Corey Schaecher, Why Trial 
Courts Have Been Quick to Cool “Global Warming” Suits, 77 TENN. L. REV. 803, 813 (2010) 
(noting that every time such a case has come before a federal judge, the judge has 
dismissed the case based on the political question doctrine).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari review in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. and overturned the 
decision of the appellate court in light of Massachusetts v. EPA.  Connecticut v. Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).  The Court found that the authority given to the EPA to 
regulate GHG emissions under the CAA displaced federal common law claims involving 
the same subject matter.  Id. 
6 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852 
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)).  The enactment of NEPA predates 
by one year the 1970 enactment of the modern CAA.  Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-604, § 111, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).  NEPA, therefore, should be viewed as an 
important point of reference for courts seeking to construe Congress’ intent concerning the 
EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA. 
7 National Environmental Policy Act § 101(b).  Congress also declared that: 
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing 
responsibility of the [f]ederal [g]overnment to use all practicable 
means, consist [sic] with other essential considerations of national 
policy, to improve and coordinate [f]ederal plans, functions, programs, 
and resources to the end that the [n]ation may— 
 (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations;  
 (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and 
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;  
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government to promote that policy through a detailed analysis of the 
environmental impacts of “proposals for legislation and other major 
[f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”8 
The notion that climate change is an environmental impact that 
warrants consideration under NEPA is a relatively recent development.9  
The issue was raised in only a few cases brought by environmental 
groups and government entities in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 
none of those cases provided a basis for directing further federal agency 
                                                                                                             
 (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment 
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and 
unintended consequences;  
 (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of 
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an 
environment which supports diversity, and variety of individual 
choice;  
 (5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which 
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s 
amenities; and  
 (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.  
Id. 
8 Id. § 102(C).  Specifically, with respect to all such legislative proposals and “major” 
federal actions, agencies must provide: 
a detailed statement . . . on— 
 (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,  
 (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented,  
 (iii) alternatives to the proposed action,  
 (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and  
 (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented. 
Id. 
9 Concern over climate change was mentioned only in passing during the congressional 
hearings leading to NEPA’s enactment in 1969.  See H.R. REP. NO. 91-378, at 5–6 (1969).  The 
report cited testimony by Dr. David M. Gates, director of the Missouri Botanical Gardens 
and Chairman of the Board of Advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Environment, 
that: 
[t]he complexity of the earth’s ecosystem . . . makes understanding it 
and the management of it a massive challenge . . . [i]s the climate 
changing in an unnatural manner . . . [h]ow much production of 
inorganic products can we produce [sic] without fouling the global 
system . . . [t]oday we are manipulating an extremely complex system:  
The ecosystems of the earth, the units of the landscape, and we do not 
know the consequences of our actions until it is too late. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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action.10  The idea began to receive serious attention in the late 1990s, 
however, when the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) issued 
draft guidance encouraging federal government agencies to consider 
climate change as part of their routine analysis of the environmental 
impacts of federal programs and actions.11  The draft guidance reviewed 
what was then the current scientific understanding of climate change 
and the evolving concern that human activities involving the emission of 
GHGs—particularly carbon dioxide—were the principal cause of the 
phenomenon.  The draft guidance stated that, while “very few federal 
agencies to date have focused on global climatic change in their NEPA 
documents, federal agencies should be aware of how their proposals 
may contribute to or be affected by climatic changes,” and that “[e]ach 
[federal] agency must exercise its own independent judgment and 
discretion . . . to determine the extent to which it should assess global 
climate change in its NEPA documents.”12 
In the nearly fifteen years since CEQ issued its initial draft guidance, 
there has been a dramatic growth in litigation asserting climate change 
claims under both NEPA and various corollary state law statutes, 
including the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).13  At the 
same time, however, some attempts to use NEPA as a means of 
responding to the challenges of global climate change may have gone 
beyond what Congress likely intended when the statute was enacted.  
This Article will provide an overview of NEPA and some of the issues 
raised in litigation to address climate change in that context, focusing on 
whether plaintiffs are sufficiently injured by potential climate change to 
have standing to challenge federal agency decision-making.14  The 
Article will also address the potential implications of Massachusetts v. 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992) 
(challenging forty-two actions and programs by the U.S. Departments of Energy, 
Agriculture, and the Interior for failure to evaluate their implications for the “greenhouse 
effect” under NEPA); City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 
478 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (challenging federal fuel economy standards based on a failure to 
consider global warming as part of a NEPA review). 
11 See Memorandum from Dinah Bear, CEQ Gen. Counsel, to all Federal Agency NEPA 
Liaisons, Re:  Draft Guidance Regarding Consideration of Global Climatic Change in 
Environmental Documents Prepared Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act 
(Oct. 8, 1997) (on file with author), available at http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/ 
compliance/reports/ceqmemo.pdf.  The CEQ was established within the Executive Office 
of the President and oversees federal agency implementation of, and compliance with, 
NEPA pursuant to the statute.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344 (2006). 
12 Memorandum from Dinah Bear to all Federal Agency NEPA Liaisons, supra note 11, at 
5. 
13 California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 2010). 
14 See infra Parts II–III (discussing the NEPA and recent Supreme Court cases applying 
the NEPA to standing issues). 
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EPA, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, and Monsanto v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, three recent Supreme Court decisions addressing standing and 
available remedies in NEPA cases.15  The Article then examines 
constitutional standing for global climate change cases brought under 
the NEPA.16 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE NEPA PROCESS 
As noted, the NEPA review process is triggered whenever a federal 
agency proposes “legislation [or] other major [f]ederal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”17  The 
statute does not define what constitutes a “[m]ajor [f]ederal action,” and 
CEQ’s implementing regulations on this subject are vague and 
somewhat circular.18  Determining whether a federal action is a “major” 
federal action depends fundamentally on whether its environmental 
impacts are “significant[].”19  The impacts’ significance depends on their 
context and intensity.20  Moreover, actions may cause environmental 
                                                 
15 See infra Part IV (discussing Massachusetts, Summers, and Monsanto). 
16 See infra Part VI (examining recent cases such as Border Power Plant Working Group v. 
DOE, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, and Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department 
of the Interior). 
17 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)).   
18 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2010) (defining “[m]ajor [f]ederal action” as “actions with 
effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to [f]ederal control and 
responsibility”).  The regulations do provide that major federal actions generally fall within 
one or more listed categories, including: 
 (1) Adoption of official policy such as rules, regulations, and 
[formally adopted administrative] interpretations . . . treaties and 
international conventions or agreements; formal documents 
establishing an agency’s policies which will result in or substantially 
alter agency programs.  
 (2) Adoption of formal plans . . . which guide or prescribe 
alternative uses of [f]ederal resources . . . . 
 (3) Adoption of programs . . . [or] systematic and connected 
agency decisions allocating agency resources . . . . 
 (4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or 
management activities located in a defined geographic area. 
Id. § 1508.18(b)(1)–(4). 
19 See id. § 1508.18 (“Major reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of 
significantly.”). 
20 Id. § 1508.27(a)–(b).  “[T]he significance of an action must be analyzed in several 
contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the affected 
interests, and the locality.  [It can also] var[y] with the setting of the proposed action.”   Id. 
§ 1508.27(a).  “Intensity . . . refers to the severity of impact.”  Id. § 1508.27(b) (emphasis 
omitted).  It takes the following considerations into account:   
 (1) Impacts . . . may be both beneficial and adverse. . . .  
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effects that may not be significant in their own right, but could 
contribute to a cumulative impact that is significant.21 
Once an agency decides that a proposed action is a major federal 
action triggering NEPA, it must then determine whether to prepare an 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”).22  The agency normally will 
prepare an EIS if the proposal is of a type that typically requires one.23  If 
the proposal is, instead, covered by a categorical exemption for projects 
not typically expected to have significant environmental consequences, 
no further environmental review is required under NEPA.24  In any other 
                                                                                                             
 (2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health 
or safety. 
 (3) Unique characteristics of the [affected] geographic area . . . . 
 (4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human 
environment are likely to be highly controversial. 
 . . . .  
 (6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for 
future actions with significant effects . . . . 
 (7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually 
insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. . . .  
 (8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect . . . [or] 
cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historical 
resources. 
 (9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an 
endangered or threatened species or its habitat . . . .  
 (10) Whether the action threatens a violation of [f]ederal, [s]tate, 
or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of the 
environment. 
Id. § 1508.27(b)(1)–(10). 
21 “Cumulative impact” is defined in the CEQ’s regulations as “the impact on the 
environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other 
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . . ”  Id. § 1508.7 (emphasis 
omitted); cf. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 413–14 (1976) (explaining the importance 
of administrative agencies in defining cumulative effects). 
22 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4; Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
23 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(1). 
24 Id. § 1501.4(a)(2).  A “categorical exclusion [may be available for] actions which do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment” (i.e., 
actions that do not really meet the definition of a major federal action in the first place) or 
which an agency has found, pursuant to its implementing regulations, are of a type that 
would have “no such effect.”  Id. § 1508.4 (emphasis omitted).  Categorical exclusions 
typically are available for routine, general administrative, or operational activities.  See, e.g., 
10 C.F.R. § 1021(d) (2010) (listing these exclusions).  Appendix A contains Department of 
Energy (“DOE”) categorical exclusions for general agency activities such as “[r]outine 
administrative/financial/personnel actions[,] . . . [c]ontract interpretations/amendments/ 
modifications, clarifying or administrative[,] . . . [t]ransfer of property, use unchanged[, and 
the] [a]ward of contracts for technical support/management and operation/personal 
services.”  Id. at app. A.  Appendix B contains DOE categorical exclusions for specific 
agency actions such as minor rate increases, training exercises and simulations, and routine 
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circumstance, an agency will normally prepare an initial environmental 
assessment (“EA”) of the project’s potential environmental impacts.25  
EAs are intended to be concise, public documents that contain “sufficient 
evidence and analysis [to allow] for [a] determin[ation] [of] whether to 
prepare [either] an [EIS] or a finding of no significant impact” 
(“FONSI”).26  A FONSI is a finding that the project will not have 
significant environmental impacts or that those impacts will be 
effectively mitigated through project modifications.27  If no categorical 
exclusion applies, and issuance of a FONSI cannot be justified, the 
agency ordinarily must prepare an EIS.  An EIS is typically prepared 
using a standard format that includes, among other things:  (1) a 
description of the purpose of, and need for, the proposed action; (2) a 
discussion of alternatives to the proposed action, including the proposed 
action itself; (3) a description of the affected environment; and (4) an 
analysis of the proposal’s environmental consequences.28 
The preparation of an EIS is a public process, and interested 
individuals and agencies are afforded opportunities to submit comments 
on a draft version of the document.29  The agency preparing the EIS must 
consider comments received and must respond in one or more of the 
following ways by:  “(1) [m]odify[ing] alternatives including the 
proposed action[;] (2) [d]evelop[ing] and evaluat[ing] alternatives not 
previously given serious consideration by the agency[;] (3) 
[s]upplement[ing], improv[ing], or modify[ing] its analyses[;] (4) 
[m]ak[ing] factual corrections[; and/or] (5) [e]xplain[ing] why the 
comments do not warrant further agency response . . . . ”30  Changes 
made as a result of these responses must be reflected in the final EIR, 
which can then be used as the basis for final agency action with respect 
to the proposal described in the document. 
NEPA itself does not provide any mechanism for challenging the 
adequacy of an EIS, or the way in which the EIS was prepared, under the 
law.  Unlike many other federal environmental laws, NEPA does not 
include a so-called “citizen suit” provision that allows private parties to 
                                                                                                             
maintenance/custodial services for buildings, structures, infrastructures, and equipment.  
Id. at app. B. 
25 Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 433 F.3d 772, 780 (10th Cir. 2006); 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.4(c). 
26 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. 
27 Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 2003); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.13. 
28 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10. 
29 Id. § 1503.1. 
30 Id. § 1503.4(a). 
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initiate civil actions to enjoin compliance with the statute.31  Instead, 
actions to prosecute claims for alleged NEPA violations must be brought 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),32 on grounds that a 
U.S. governmental agency has failed to comply with applicable 
procedural requirements in approving the proposed action.33  Under the 
APA, any person “aggrieved” by a federal agency action may bring a 
lawsuit to challenge the action as procedurally deficient or otherwise 
inconsistent with applicable law; this includes the provisions of NEPA.34  
The Court, on several occasions, has defined the essential requirements 
for aggrieved parties to bring suit against a federal agency under the 
NEPA. 
III.  THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
CASES:  LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE AND FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V. 
LAIDLAW 
The 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,35 
is the seminal case defining the contemporary requirements for standing 
in environmental cases.  Lujan was not a NEPA case; rather, it 
specifically concerned the authority of the Department of the Interior to 
adopt regulations implementing the Federal Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”).36  Nevertheless, it has been cited widely as the case that 
delineated the principal criteria for standing that must be met by 
                                                 
31 See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990)) (“[N]o provision of NEPA explicitly grants any 
person or entity standing to enforce the statute.”).  An example of a citizen suit provision 
that has been widely used over the years is section 505 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).  
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).  Section 505 provides, subject to certain limitations, that: 
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf— 
 (1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency . . .  who is alleged to be 
in violation of [the Act] . . . or  
 (2) against the Administrator [of the United States EPA] to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary 
with the Administrator. 
Id. 
32 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
33 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176–77. 
34 5 U.S.C. § 702(a). 
35 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
36 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).  The regulations at issue in the case were ones intended “to 
render [the statute]  applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas.”  
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558. 
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plaintiffs challenging governmental action under NEPA, as well as other 
federal environmental statutes.37 
The majority opinion in Lujan, delivered by Justice Scalia, provides a 
succinct summary of federal judicial standing requirements.  According 
to Justice Scalia: 
 Over the years, our cases have established that the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains 
three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
“actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”  
Second, there must be a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to 
be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent 
action of some third party not before the court.”  Third, 
it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” 
that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision.”38 
The Lujan Court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the first of 
these criteria, “injury in fact,” because they were unable to show how the 
government’s implementing regulation resulted in imminent injury to 
their personal interests.39  According to the Court, “‘the “injury in fact” 
test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest.  It requires that 
the party seeking review be himself among the injured.’”40  The Court 
also found the plaintiffs failed to meet the third criterion—
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (denying standing to 
environmental groups challenging regulations governing procedures for decisions 
implementing land and resource development plans under the Forest and Rangeland 
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (allowing standing to an environmental group seeking 
imposition of injunctive relief in a citizen suit under the CWA); Salmon Spawning & 
Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying standing to an 
environmental group seeking to pursue claims against the National Marine Fisheries 
Service, the Department of Commerce, and the State Department).  Furthermore, it was 
alleged that United States’ entry and participation in the Pacific Salmon Treaty (“Treaty”) 
violated the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the APA.  Id.; Pye v. United States, 269 
F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2001) (allowing standing to a neighboring landowner challenging a U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to issue a permit to construct a road crossing within the 
waters of the United States). 
38 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
39 Id. at 563 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40 See id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972)). 
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“redressability”—because they had chosen to challenge a generalized 
level of government action, ESA implementing regulations, rather than 
attack separate decisions involving particular projects that might 
allegedly have caused them harm.41  According to Justice Scalia, “‘suits 
challenging, not specifically identifiable [g]overnment violations of law, 
but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal 
obligations . . . [are], even when premised on allegations of several 
instances of violations of law, . . . rarely if ever appropriate for federal-
court adjudication.’”42 
Finally, the Court addressed the claim that respondents had 
standing because they had suffered a “procedural injury.”  The Court 
based its determination on the ESA’s “citizen suit” provision, which 
states that, “‘any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf 
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other 
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in 
violation of’” the statute.43  The appellate court held that this “provision 
create[d] a procedural righ[t] . . . in all ‘persons,’—so that anyone could 
file a suit” challenging the government’s “failure to follow [ESA 
procedures], notwithstanding [the absence of] any discrete injury 
flowing from that failure.”44  The Supreme Court rejected that position, 
largely on the grounds that plaintiffs’ ESA challenge was no more 
unique to the plaintiffs than to members of the public at large, and 
therefore, it did not state a justiciable case or controversy under Article 
III of the United States Constitution.45 
The majority opinion in Lujan did not hold that a plaintiff could 
never establish injury based solely on a “procedural injury;” indeed, 
Justice Scalia specifically distinguished the case from one: 
where plaintiffs [were] seeking to enforce a procedural 
requirement the disregard of which could impair a 
separate concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural 
requirement for a hearing prior to denial of their license 
application, or the procedural requirement for an 
                                                 
41 Id. at 568. 
42 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–60 (1984)). 
43 Id. at 571–72 (alteration in original); see 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006) (setting forth the 
ESA’s citizen suit provision). 
44 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting the court of appeals’ decision 
at 911 F.2d 117, 121–22 (8th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45 Id. at 573–74. 
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environmental impact statement before a federal facility 
is constructed next door to them).46 
Moreover, the Court made clear that “[n]othing in this [opinion] 
contradicts the principle that ‘[t]he . . . injury required by [Article] III 
may exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion 
of which creates standing.”’”47 
Despite these qualifications, Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice 
O’Connor joined, wrote a strong dissent arguing that the majority had 
sought “to impose fresh limitations on the constitutional authority of 
Congress to allow citizen suits in the federal courts for injuries deemed 
‘procedural’ in nature,” and “conclud[ed] that any ‘procedural injury’ 
suffered by respondents is insufficient to confer standing.”48  The dissent 
rejected this conclusion, and pointed out that the Court in fact had found 
standing in prior cases involving “procedurally oriented statutes,” 
including NEPA.49  Justice Blackmun then expressed the “hope[] that 
over time the Court will acknowledge that some classes of procedural 
duties are so enmeshed with the prevention of a substantive, concrete 
harm that an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient 
likelihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural duty.”50 
The notion that the majority opinion in Lujan imposed fresh 
limitations on the authority of Congress to allow citizen suits in the 
federal courts was undermined to some degree by the Court’s decision in 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.51  Like 
                                                 
46 Id. at 572. 
47 Id. at 578 (alteration in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Scalia went on to clarify, however, that: 
As we said in Sierra Club, “[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of 
injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter 
from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must 
himself have suffered an injury.”  Whether or not the principle set 
forth in Warth can be extended beyond that distinction, . . . in suits 
against the [g]overnment, at least, the concrete injury requirement 
must remain. 
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
48 Id. at 589–90, 601 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. at 603 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 
(1989)).  The “Court considered injury from violation of the ‘action-forcing’ procedures of  
[NEPA], in particular the requirements for issuance of [EIS].”  Id. 
50 Id. at 605.  Expressing his hopes for future expansion of standing to incorporate 
strictly procedural injuries, Justice Blackmun observed that he could not join the majority 
opining in what he thought “amount[ed] to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of 
environmental standing.  In my view, ‘[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.’”  Id. at 606 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). 
51 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
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Lujan, Laidlaw focused on the issue of standing to sue under a direct 
citizen suit provision of a federal environmental statute—in this case, the 
Federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”).52  Several environmental groups 
brought the case, seeking injunctive relief and the imposition of civil 
penalties, for alleged violations of a state-issued permit authorizing the 
discharge of treated industrial wastewater into the North Tyger River in 
South Carolina.53  The government moved for summary judgment on, 
inter alia, the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence 
demonstrating injury in fact, as required under Lujan, and that the 
plaintiffs therefore lacked Article III standing to bring the lawsuit.54  The 
Court, however, rejected the defendant’s argument on this point. 
Relying on its decision in Lujan, the Court found that factual 
averments in affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs adequately 
documented the existence of an injury in fact.55  The Court pointed out 
that it had previously “held that environmental plaintiffs adequately 
allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and 
are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area 
will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.”56  That these averments 
were conditional in nature—claiming that the plaintiffs’ members would 
use the North Tyger River for recreation if it were not being polluted—
was not material in this context.  According to the Court, they still could 
not be equated with the speculative “‘“some day” intentions’ to visit 
endangered species halfway around the world,” which the Court found 
insufficient to show injury in fact in Lujan.57 
The Laidlaw case did not deal with NEPA per se.  Nevertheless, the 
Court’s discussion of the standing issue bears directly on the capacity of 
private citizens to pursue challenges under NEPA—including actions 
with potential global climate change consequences.  The Court stated 
                                                 
52 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).  Section 505(a) of the CWA authorizes any “person or persons 
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected” by an alleged violation of the 
statute to bring an action to compel future compliance with the Act, through the imposition 
of injunctive relief or civil penalties.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g). 
53 The permit was issued by the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (“DHEC”), acting pursuant to authority delegated to it under the 
CWA.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (delegating authority under the CWA). 
54 Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 177. 
55 Id. at 180–82.  The factual averments stated, for example, that the plaintiffs’ members 
lived near the permitted discharge point, occasionally drove over the river, which looked 
and smelled polluted, and would like to fish, camp, swim, and picnic in and near the river 
but would not do so because of concerns that the river was polluted.  Id. 
56 Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). The Court stated, 
“‘[o]f course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic 
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing.’”  Id. (quoting Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992)). 
57 Id. at 169 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). 
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that its ruling on standing in Laidlaw was entirely consistent with its 
earlier decision in Lujan, which involved both NEPA and the APA.58  In 
Lujan, the Court held that the plaintiff could not establish standing to sue 
“merely by offering ‘averments which state only that one of [the 
organization’s] members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract 
of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or 
probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action.’”59  In contrast, 
the Laidlaw Court found that the “reasonable concerns” expressed by the 
plaintiffs and their members about the effects of pollutant discharges to 
the North Tyger River “directly affected” their “recreational, aesthetic, 
and economic interests,” and they “present[ed] dispositively more than 
the mere ‘general averments’ and ‘conclusory allegations’ found 
inadequate in Lujan . . . .”60 
IV.  RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
CASES 
Since its decision in Laidlaw, the Supreme Court has decided several 
cases addressing standing in environmental cases.  The first of these, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, considered the issue in the context of global climate 
change.61  Two years after the Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, it 
elaborated on the standing issue in Summers v. Earth Island Institute.62  
Finally, in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,63 the Court dealt with 
standing explicitly in the context of NEPA.64  Each of these cases reflect a 
commitment by the Court to stand by the strict requirements for 
standing articulated in Lujan.  Furthermore, these cases suggest that the 
relatively cavalier approach taken in cases such as Border Power and 
Watson would not and should not be sustained.65  This Part addresses 
each of these cases in turn, beginning with Massachusetts v. EPA. 
                                                 
58 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).  The plaintiff in Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Federation alleged that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) and other federal parties had violated the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) and NEPA in the course of administering the BLM’s land 
withdrawal appraisal program, pursuant to which they make various decisions affecting 
the status of public lands and their availability for private uses, including mining.  Id.  The 
plaintiff contended that the program should be set aside because it was arbitrary, variable, 
an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with law.  Id. 
59 Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 169 (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 889). 
60 Id. at 169. 
61 See infra Part IV.A (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA). 
62 See infra Part IV.B (discussing Summers v. Earth Island Institute). 
63 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
64 See infra Part IV.C (discussing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms). 
65 See infra Part V (applying the principles in Lujan, Massachusetts, Summers, and 
Monsanto to district court cases). 
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A. Massachusetts v. EPA 
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.66  The case addressed the EPA’s authority to 
regulate GHG emissions under the CAA.67  The plaintiffs, which 
included twelve states, four local government entities, and a variety of 
environmental and public interest groups, specifically challenged the 
EPA’s rejection of rulemaking petitions regarding the regulation of 
tailpipe emissions from cars and trucks under Section 202(a)(1) of the 
CAA.68  Of the various governmental and private party plaintiffs, 
however, only the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was found to have 
standing.69 
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA framed its standing analysis 
squarely within the requirements described in Lujan, noting that: 
To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, Lujan 
holds that a litigant must demonstrate that it has 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is 
either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly 
traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a 
favorable decision will redress that injury.70 
Moreover, “a litigant to whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural 
right to protect his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert that right without 
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”71  
Finding that only Massachusetts had standing within this framework, 
the Court stated that it was “of considerable relevance that the party 
seeking review . . . is a sovereign [s]tate and not, as it was in Lujan, a 
private individual.”72  The Court noted that Congress had granted a 
procedural right under the APA to challenge the rejection of 
Massachusetts’ rulemaking petition.  It also found that, given this right 
and “Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the 
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing 
analysis.”73 
                                                 
66 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
68 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497. 
69 Id. at 498. 
70 Id. at 517. 
71 Id. at 517–18. 
72 Id. at 518. 
73 Id. at 520. 
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Despite this entitlement to “special solicitude,” the majority opinion 
in Massachusetts v. EPA made it clear that Massachusetts’ right to 
challenge the EPA’s actions met the fundamental requirements of 
standing enunciated in Lujan.  According to the Court, “petitioners’ 
submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most 
demanding standards of the adversarial process.  [The] EPA’s steadfast 
refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions presents a risk of harm to 
Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent’” and therefore 
sufficient to show injury in fact to Massachusetts’ concrete interests.74  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, was persuaded to grant 
Massachusetts standing based, in part, on Massachusetts’ argument that 
it was jeopardized imminently by rising sea levels, which had already 
begun to engulf the state’s coastal land.75  Moreover, those changes had, 
and would continue to have, a direct and particularized impact on 
Massachusetts, which owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal 
property and operates or maintains a wide variety of coastal-related 
public resources and infrastructure.76 
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized Justice Stevens’ 
willingness to give Massachusetts a special status for standing purposes 
and Stevens’ conclusion that the Commonwealth had suffered injury in 
fact under Lujan.  On the latter point, Justice Roberts specifically 
disagreed with the suggestion that Massachusetts’ global warming-
related injuries could legitimately be considered actual, not conjectural, 
although by and large these criticisms really centered on the weight 
given by Justice Stevens to the facts offered by Massachusetts as 
evidence of its purported coastal injuries.77  Of perhaps greater note is 
Justice Roberts’ observation regarding the connection between injury in 
fact and the two other elements of any standing analysis under Lujan:  
causation and redressability.  According to Justice Roberts: 
Petitioners’ reliance on Massachusetts’[] loss of coastal 
land as their injury in fact for standing purposes creates 
insurmountable problems for them with respect to 
causation and redressability.  To establish standing, 
                                                 
74 Id. at 521. 
75 Id. at 522. 
76 Id. at 541 n.19. 
77 See id. at 542–43 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992)).  As 
described by Justice Roberts, the Court observes that “global sea levels rose somewhere 
between [ten] and [twenty] centimeters over the [twentieth] century as a result of global 
warming” and that “[t]hese rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ 
coastal land.”  Id. at 522 (citation omitted).  But none of petitioners’ declarations supports 
that connection.  Id. at 541. 
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petitioners must show a causal connection between that 
specific injury and the lack of new motor vehicle [GHG] 
emission standards, and that the promulgation of such 
standards would likely redress that injury.  As is often 
the case, the questions of causation and redressability 
overlap.  And importantly, when a party is challenging 
the [g]overnment’s allegedly unlawful regulation, or 
lack of regulation, of a third party, satisfying the 
causation and redressability requirements becomes 
“substantially more difficult.”78 
Justice Roberts emphasized that causation and redressability are 
significant considerations in the analysis of standing in most cases.  What 
Justice Roberts did not acknowledge, however, is that, even under Lujan, 
these factors, particularly redressability, are less significant in cases 
where the injury in fact is a procedural one.79  Fundamental to the 
majority’s analysis of Massachusetts’ standing, as previously noted, was 
the fact that Congress had given Massachusetts a procedural right under 
the APA to challenge the EPA’s decision not to regulate GHG emissions; 
this was part of Justice Stevens justification, giving Massachusetts 
“special solicitude in our standing analysis.”80  Thus, to the extent that 
the injury in fact suffered by Massachusetts had a procedural 
                                                 
78 Id. at 542−43 (citation omitted) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562).  As to the issue of 
causation, Justice Roberts observed: 
Petitioners are never able to trace their alleged injuries back through 
this complex web to the fractional amount of global emissions that 
might have been limited with EPA standards.  In light of the bit-part 
domestic new motor vehicle [GHG] emissions have played in what 
petitioners describe as a 150-year global phenomenon, and the myriad 
additional factors bearing on petitioners’ alleged injury—the loss of 
Massachusetts coastal land—the connection is far too speculative to 
establish causation. 
Id.  As to redressability, Justice Roberts rejected the majority’s contention that: 
[R]egulating domestic motor vehicle emissions will reduce carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, and therefore redress Massachusetts’s injury.  
But even if regulation does reduce emissions—to some indeterminate 
degree, given events elsewhere in the world—the Court never explains 
why that makes it likely that the injury in fact—the loss of land—will 
be redressed.  Schoolchildren know that a kingdom might be lost “all 
for the want of a horseshoe nail,” but “likely” redressability is a 
different matter. 
Id. at 546. 
79 Id. at 517–18 (ruling that the person who has been “‘accorded a procedural right to 
protect his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert that right without meeting all the normal 
standards for redressability and immediacy’”). 
80 Id. at 520. 
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component, the hurdles presented by causation and redressability 
presumably are diminished under the traditional standing analysis, with 
a more rigorous assessment of those factors arguably becoming 
unnecessary. 
The implications of an injury in fact being procedural in nature are 
particularly important in NEPA cases, as that is the essence of the injury 
that occurs whenever NEPA is violated.  Thus, in evaluating standing 
claims made by plaintiffs in cases raising claim change issues under 
NEPA, the principal inquiry can legitimately focus on whether those 
plaintiffs can show a “concrete and particularized” injury to their 
interest that is “actual or imminent,” and not “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical.”  As the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions on 
standing in environmental cases confirm, the failure to make such a 
showing would be fatal.81 
B. Summers v. Earth Island Institute 
On March 3, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5–4 decision, 
Summers v. Earth Island Institute,82 reversing a holding by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that allowed environmental groups to 
challenge certain federal actions in the absence of a dispute over their 
concrete application.  In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the principle that standing requires at least some showing that 
members of these groups would suffer a concrete injury to their interests, 
even when those interests are just procedural in nature. 
                                                 
81 In a recent decision involving claims based on climate change, the Supreme Court 
brushed aside preliminary objections that the plaintiffs (several states, the City of New 
York, and three private land trusts) could maintain federal common law public nuisance 
claims against carbon-dioxide emitters (four private power companies and the federal 
Tennessee Valley Authority).  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).  
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg stated that: 
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to 
adjudicate this case.  Four members of the Court would hold that at 
least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts [v. 
EPA], which permitted a [s]tate to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate 
[GHG] emissions, and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars 
review.  Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion 
in Massachusetts [v. EPA], or regarding that decision as distinguishable, 
would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing.  We 
therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s 
exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits. 
Id. at 2535 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see Nye v. United States, 313 
U.S. 33, 44 (1941). 
82 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
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In December 2003, five environmental groups filed suit in the 
Eastern District of California challenging a U.S. Forest Service (“Service”) 
decision.83  The Service refused to apply certain procedural requirements 
to the Burnt Ridge Project, a decision to hold a salvage sale of timber 
damaged by a fire on two hundred and thirty-eight acres of forestland in 
the Sequoia National Forest.  These requirements had been included in 
regulations the Service adopted to implement the Forest Service 
Decision-Making and Appeals Reform Act of 1992 (“Act”).84  The 
regulations exempted certain projects, including salvage timber sales, 
from the Service’s general notice and comment and administrative 
appeals procedures if the projects were otherwise exempt from 
requirements to prepare an EIS or EA.85 
The district court initially granted the plaintiffs’ request for a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the Burnt Ridge Project from going 
forward.  The parties subsequently entered into a settlement that 
removed the validity of the Burnt Ridge sale as an issue in the case.86  
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that plaintiffs retained 
standing to pursue claims that the Service’s procedural regulations were 
invalid as a general matter.  It then adjudicated the merits of those 
claims, deciding in favor of the plaintiffs and entering a nationwide 
injunction against application of the regulations.87 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the 
Service’s procedural exemptions were invalid, and upheld the 
nationwide injunction.88  The government then sought review of two 
issues in the U.S. Supreme Court:  (1) whether the respondents had 
standing to pursue their challenge of the Service’s regulations in light of 
the settlement of their specific dispute over the Burnt Ridge Project; and 
(2) whether a nationwide injunction was appropriate relief.  The Court 
ruled against the respondents on the first issue and did not address the 
second issue. 
                                                 
83 The groups that brought the case included the Earth Island Institute, the Sequoia 
Forest Keeper, the Center for Biological Diversity, Heartwood, Inc., and the Sierra Club.  Id. 
84 Forest Service Decision-Making and Appeals Reform Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-381, 
§ 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006)). 
85 36 C.F.R. §§ 215(a), 215.12(f) (2010). 
86 Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D. Cal. 2005), amended in part 
sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL 5280466, at *2 
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 490 F.3d 687 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
87 Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL 5280466, at *2 (E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 490 F.3d 687 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
88 Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
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Justice Scalia’s majority opinion summarized the familiar Lujan 
requirements for standing in the context of a request for injunctive 
relief.89  It also recognized the right of environmental and other groups 
to claim standing on the basis of injuries to the interests of their 
members.90  Finally, it accepted, as the government had conceded, that 
the respondents might have maintained standing had the injuries alleged 
in connection with the Burnt Ridge Project continued to be at issue.  The 
problem, however, was that respondents had settled their concerns 
regarding the Burnt Ridge Project, and the injuries they alleged in that 
connection were therefore no longer at issue.  In sum, even if there had 
been a legitimate basis for bringing their lawsuit in the first place, 
plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished it through their settlement.  According 
to Justice Scalia: 
We know of no precedent for the proposition that when 
a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain 
action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he 
retains standing to challenge the basis for that action 
(here, the regulation in the abstract), apart from any 
concrete application that threatens imminent harm to his 
interests.  Such a holding would fly in the face of Article 
III’s injury-in-fact requirement.91 
The opinion also dismissed the argument that respondents had 
standing to maintain their suit because of a procedural injury, namely 
that they had been and would continue to be denied the ability to file 
comments on some Service actions under the challenged regulations.  As 
Justice Scalia stated, “deprivation of a procedural right without some 
concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right 
in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.”92  Moreover, “[i]t 
                                                 
89 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1149–50 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).  Other than 
with respect to the Burnt Ridge Project, plaintiffs submitted only a single affidavit to the 
district court to document “injuries” sufficient to support standing to challenge the 
Service’s procedural regulation.  Id.  The affidavit included statements by one of the 
plaintiffs that he had been injured in the past by development on Service land, that he had 
visited many National Forests before, and that he planned to visit several unnamed 
National Forests in the future.  Id. at 1149.  The affidavit failed to mention any particular 
timber sale or other project subject to the regulations at issue.  Id.  The majority opinion 
dismissed these statements as insufficient to “‘support a finding of the “actual or 
imminent” injury that our cases require.’”  Id. at 1151 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)).  
92 Id. 
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makes no difference [whether a] procedural right has been accorded by 
Congress[, as in fact was true in the present case].  That can loosen the 
strictures of the redressability prong of our standing inquiry . . . .  Unlike 
redressability, however, the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor 
of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”93 
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg.  The dissent criticized the majority’s standing analysis, 
suggesting that it relied too heavily on an argument that the alleged 
injury to a plaintiff’s interest must be “imminent,” as opposed to 
conjectural or hypothetical.  Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Court 
had, in the past, “used the word ‘imminent’ in the context of 
constitutional standing.”94  But, he argued, the word was “more 
appropriately considered in the context of ripeness or the necessity of 
injunctive relief.”95  When it comes to standing all that is necessary is that 
“there is a realistic likelihood that the challenged future conduct will, in 
fact, recur and harm the plaintiff.”96  Proposing this “realistic likelihood” 
test, the dissent relied on the Court’s 1983 decision in Lyons,97 which 
predated Lujan’s definitive articulation of the requirements for standing 
by nearly a decade.98 
The dissent also suggested that its standing analysis complied with 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  Justice Breyer viewed Massachusetts v. EPA as 
holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had “standing to 
complain of a procedural failing, namely, EPA’s failure properly to 
determine whether to restrict carbon dioxide emissions, even though that 
failing would create Massachusetts-based harm which (though likely to 
occur) might not occur for several decades.”99  As discussed, however, 
this characterization is incomplete and somewhat misleading.  First, 
Massachusetts did not merely rely on a characterization of harms it faced 
through global warming as a “procedural” injury; rather, it offered 
factual evidence that the Commonwealth was currently suffering 
concrete harm as a result of global warming.100  Second, Massachusetts, 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1156 (emphasis in original). 
97 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
98 Lyons addressed a set of facts that bore little resemblance to the issues in Lujan and 
Summers.  See id. at 107, 108 n.7 (discussing how the plaintiff  had been subject to an 
unlawful police chokehold in the past and was found to lack standing absent a showing 
that there was a “realistic threat” that possible recurrence of this behavior would cause him 
harm in the reasonably near future). 
99 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007)). 
100 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522.  As the Court indicated: 
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as a state, had a special “stake in protecting . . . quasi-sovereign interests, 
which entitled [it] to special solicitude in [the Court’s] standing 
analysis.”101  Without its combined demonstration of present injury and 
“quasi-sovereign” status, there is no reason to believe that Massachusetts 
(any more than the other public and private petitioners) would have 
been granted the right to proceed.  Justice Breyer’s suggestion in the 
dissent in Summers—that Article III standing can be established through 
prediction of a harm that “might not occur for several decades”—is 
inconsistent with Massachusetts v. EPA and with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on standing, developed subsequent to Lujan.102 
Summers was initially criticized by some as imposing new limitations 
on the rights of plaintiffs to seek redress for environmental wrongs in 
federal court.103  These criticisms were unwarranted.  The Summers 
decision simply confirmed the principal that has been widely 
recognized, since Lujan, as fundamental to the constitutional doctrine of 
                                                                                                             
According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose 
somewhere between [ten] and [twenty] centimeters over the 
[twentieth] century as a result of global warming.  These rising seas 
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.  Because 
the Commonwealth “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal 
property,” it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a 
landowner.  The severity of that injury will only increase over the 
course of the next century . . . . 
Id. at 522–23 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
101 Id. at 520. 
102 Summers, 555 U.S. at 506.  In addition to its criticism of the majority opinion’s 
discussion of the test for standing under Article III, the dissent questioned its failure to 
consider various affidavits submitted by respondents in an endeavor to establish injury 
subsequent to the district court’s judgment.  Id. at 508−09.  In making this point, the dissent 
relied on “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which says that ‘[t]he court may permit 
supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or 
defense.’”  Id. at 509 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d)).  The majority dismissed this argument 
out of hand, stating that:  
The dissent cites no instance in which “supplementation” has been 
permitted to resurrect and alter the outcome in a case that has gone to 
judgment, and indeed after notice of appeal had been filed.  If Rule 
15(b) allows additional facts to be inserted into the record after appeal 
has been filed, we are at the threshold of a brave new world of trial 
practice in which Rule 60 [specifying grounds for relief from district 
court judgments and orders] has been swallowed whole by Rule 15(b). 
Id. at 500. 
103 See, e.g., Maria Banda, Comment, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 34 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 321, 321 (2010) (listing a number of law firm “commentators . . . conclud[ing] that 
the Supreme Court had created additional jurisdictional obstacles for environmental 
plaintiffs to prove standing in cases involving procedural injuries”); see also Michelle Fon 
Anne Lee, Note, Surviving Summers, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 381, 383 (2010) (“According to 
certain commentators, Summers represents a significant tightening of standing 
doctrine . . . .”). 
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standing:  namely, that any private party seeking redress from a court 
must demonstrate a real injury for which redress is indeed meaningful.  
That requirement applies regardless of whether the interest is 
substantive, or simply an interest in seeing that the government follows 
proper administrative procedures to implement its regulatory authority. 
C. Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms 
In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,104 the Supreme Court 
addressed standing specifically within the context of a request for 
injunctive relief from agency actions allegedly violating NEPA.  
Monsanto does not concern climate change per se; however, the Court’s 
treatment of the standing issue reinforces the importance of injury in fact 
for any case involving claims under NEPA and related environmental 
statutes. 
Monsanto involved a decision by the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (“APHIS”), within the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, to deregulate a variety of genetically engineered alfalfa 
known as “Roundup Ready Alfalfa” (“RRA”).105  The district court held 
that APHIS violated NEPA by issuing its deregulation decision without 
first completing an EIS.106  To remedy the violation, the district court:  (1) 
vacated the agency’s decision completely deregulating the alfalfa variety 
in question; (2) ordered APHIS not to act on the deregulation petition in 
whole, or in part, until it completed a detailed environmental review; 
and (3) enjoined almost all future planting of the genetically engineered 
alfalfa pending the completion of that review.107  The appellate court 
subsequently affirmed the district court’s entry of permanent injunctive 
relief.108 
The Court addressed standing as a preliminary issue before 
addressing the merits of the case: 
Article III standing requires an injury that is (i) concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent, (ii) fairly 
traceable to the challenged action, and (iii) redressable 
by a favorable ruling.  Petitioners are injured by their 
inability to sell or license RRA to prospective customers 
until APHIS completes the EIS.  Because that injury is 
caused by the very remedial order that petitioners 
                                                 
104 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 2743–44. 
107 Id. at 2746. 
108 Id. 
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challenge on appeal, it would be redressed by a 
favorable ruling from this Court.109 
With respect to petitioners’ contention that respondents lacked 
standing to seek injunctive relief, the Court rejected petitioners’ 
argument that respondents had failed to show that any of the named 
respondents were likely to suffer a constitutionally cognizable injury 
absent injunctive relief.110  The Court noted the district court’s finding 
that respondents, including conventional alfalfa farmers, had 
“‘established a “reasonable probability” that their organic and 
conventional alfalfa crops will be infected with the engineered gene’ [in 
RRA] if RRA is completely deregulated.”111  According to the Court, this 
“reasonable probability of harm” was sufficient to establish standing: 
Such harms, which respondents will suffer even if their 
crops are not actually infected with the Roundup ready 
gene, are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
prong of the constitutional standing analysis. Those 
harms are readily attributable to APHIS’s deregulation 
decision, which, as the [d]istrict [c]ourt found, gives rise 
to a significant risk of gene flow to non-genetically-
engineered varieties of alfalfa. Finally, a judicial order 
                                                 
109 Id. at 2747 (citation omitted).  Among the arguments advanced in support of the fact 
that the petitioners lacked standing was that petitioners’ injury was actually caused by the 
district court’s vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision.  Id. at 2754.  “The practical 
consequence of the vacatur was to restore RRA to the status of a regulated article, . . . the 
growth and sale” of which ordinarily would be banned.  Id. at 2752.  “Because petitioners 
did not specifically challenge the vacatur, respondents [argued that] they lacked standing 
to challenge” issuance of an injunction that had no independent consequences for the 
vacatur.  Id. at 2753.  The Court rejected this argument, finding that petitioners had 
“preserved their objection [to] the vacated deregulation decision” by suggesting that the 
vacatur “should have been replaced by [an] injunction” and that “if the [d]istrict [c]ourt 
had adopted [this] suggested remedy, there would still be authority for the continued 
planting of RRA because there would, in effect, be a new deregulation decision.”  Id. at 
2753.  In addition, the Court stated that: 
If the injunction were lifted, we do not see why the [d]istrict [c]ourt 
would have to remand the matter to the agency in order for APHIS to 
effect a partial deregulation.  And even if a remand were required, we 
perceive no basis on which the [d]istrict [c]ourt could decline to 
remand the matter to the agency so that it could determine whether to 
pursue a partial deregulation during the pendency of the EIS process. 
Id. at 2754. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. at 2754–55 n.3 (“At least one of the respondents in this case specifically allege[d] 
that he owns an alfalfa farm in a prominent seed-growing region and faces a significant 
risk of contamination from RRA.  Other declarations . . . [suggested] that the deregulation 
of RRA pose[d] a significant risk of contamination . . . .”(internal citations omitted)). 
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prohibiting the growth and sale of all or some 
genetically engineered alfalfa would remedy 
respondents’ injuries by eliminating or minimizing the 
risk of gene flow to conventional and organic alfalfa 
crops.  We therefore conclude that respondents have 
constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from the 
complete deregulation order at issue here.112 
The “reasonable probability of harm” test on which the Court relied 
in Monsanto sounds similar to the “realistic likelihood” test employed by 
the dissent, but rejected by the majority, in Summers.  However, the harm 
faced by the respondents in Monsanto was not just the probabilistic risk 
that the crops of some of the respondents might be contaminated by the 
modified RRA gene.  Rather, the harm was the alleged non-probabilistic 
certainty that those respondents would suffer an imminent economic 
injury because of their need to take various costly measures to address 
that risk, like testing to confirm whether contamination was, in fact, 
present.113  The substantial and imminent nature of these economic 
harms caused the Court to find injury in fact for standing purposes—the 
realistic likelihood of crop contamination was, at most, a secondary 
consideration.  Viewed from that perspective, the “reasonable 
probability of harm” test that the Monsanto Court employed is entirely 
consistent with the Court’s emphasis in prior cases on the necessity of a 
concrete and imminent injury in fact for standing purposes (whether or 
not the injury alleged is procedural). 
V.  STANDING UNDER NEPA IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
Although Supreme Court jurisprudence may seem clear, several 
district courts have sought to grant standing in cases that seem 
inconsistent with Court precedent.  In particular, three cases—Border 
                                                 
112 Id. at 2755. 
113 Id.  The Court noted representations made in the declarations that: 
[T]o continue marketing their product to consumers who wish to buy 
non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, respondents would have to conduct 
testing to find out whether and to what extent their crops have been 
contaminated.  Respondents also allege that the risk of gene flow will 
cause them to take certain measures to minimize the likelihood of 
potential contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of non-
genetically-engineered alfalfa. 
Id. (citations omitted); see id. (echoing respondents who stated that, “‘[d]ue to the threat of 
contamination, I have begun contracting with growers outside of the United States to 
ensure that I can supply genetically pure, conventional alfalfa seed’”).  “‘Finding new 
growers has already resulted in increased administrative costs at my seed business.’”  Id. 
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Power Plant Working Group v. DOE (“Border Power I”),114 Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Watson,115 and Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 
Department of Interior116—seem out of line with Supreme Court mandates. 
A. Expanding Lujan in Border Power I 
Border Power I,117 one of the first cases brought under NEPA to 
consider the issue of standing in the context of global climate change, 
involved a decision by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and the 
Federal Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) to forgo the preparation 
of an EIS for the construction of transmission lines designed to connect 
new Mexican power plants to the California power grid.118  The DOE and 
the BLM independently prepared initial EAs for the project.119  Based on 
the analysis contained in the EAs, both agencies “issued a [f]inding of 
[n]o [s]ignificant [i]mpact,” each of which concluded that NEPA required 
no further environmental review.120  The plaintiff, an organization 
allegedly established for the sole purpose of challenging the project, filed 
an action asserting that the agencies’ NEPA review was inadequate 
because they failed to evaluate the impact of emissions from the Mexican 
power plants that would be generating the electricity transported by the 
transmission line project.121 
The court first evaluated whether the plaintiff had standing under 
NEPA and APA.  Neither the DOE nor the BLM challenged the plaintiff’s 
standing to bring the action in federal court.  However, the district court 
determined that an evaluation of standing was necessary in order to 
establish jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims.122  The district court 
began its standing analysis with a recitation of the Lujan criteria, but it 
then observed that the most important of these three criteria in 
procedural cases brought under NEPA and APA is the requirement of 
injury in fact.123  According to the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court 
                                                 
114 See infra Part V.A (discussing Border Power I). 
115 See infra Part V.B (discussing Friends of the Earth). 
116 See infra Part V.C (discussing Center for Biological Diversity). 
117 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
118 See id. at 1006 (discussing how the DOE had been asked to issue “[p]residential 
[p]ermits” to allow crossborder construction of the power lines).  BLM had been asked to 
issue similar permits for necessary rights of way across the United States where the lines 
would be located.  Id. 
119 See id. at 1008. 
120 Id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 1008–11. 
123 Id. at 1009.  In this context, the district court cited footnote 7 in the Lujan plurality 
opinion, which the court claimed acknowledged the special status of “‘procedural rights’” 
in cases involving statutes like NEPA.  Id.  The Court stated that: 
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of Appeals, in particular, has emphasized the importance of injury in fact 
in procedural cases and reduced the elements that must be shown to 
establish procedural standing to the following:  “‘(1) that he or she is a 
person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect [his or her] 
concrete interests . . . and (2) that the plaintiff has some threatened 
concrete interest . . . that is the ultimate basis of [his or her] standing.’”124 
Having articulated its views on the applicable requirements for 
standing under NEPA, the district court found that the plaintiff, an 
association comprised of various individuals living near the proposed 
transmission project, met those requirements.125  It based that finding on 
the declarations of association members who allegedly lived “near” the 
project (in either Imperial County, California or Mexicali, Mexico) and 
“who shar[ed] a concern for the environmental health of the border 
region.”126  Beyond that, it did not discuss with any specificity how the 
proposed project would in fact result in a concrete injury that could form 
the basis for standing under Lujan.  In particular, the court did not 
indicate whether it considered the potential contribution to global 
warming by carbon dioxide emissions from the Mexican power plants as 
a basis for plaintiff’s standing, even though it accepted plaintiff’s 
evidence “that carbon dioxide emissions are the greatest by weight of all 
pollutants emitted by natural gas turbines” of the sort proposed for use 
in those facilities.127 
After glossing over the standing question, the court considered 
whether the alleged connection between the federal action and climate 
                                                                                                             
The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his 
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal 
standards for redressability and immediacy.  Thus, under our case law, 
one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally 
licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to 
prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot 
establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to 
be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be 
completed for many years. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). 
124 Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d. at 1010 (citing Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 
1500 (9th Cir. 1995)); see Pac. Nw. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 25 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that plaintiffs with an economic interest in preserving salmon have a 
procedural interest in ensuring that the ESA is followed); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. U.S. 
Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that residents who live near the site of a 
proposed port have procedural standing to sue for the Navy’s alleged failure to follow 
permitting regulations); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that a city located near a proposed freeway interchange has procedural standing to 
challenge an agency’s failure to prepare an EIS). 
125 See Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d. at 1010–11. 
126 Id. at 1010 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Id. at 1029. 
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change warranted review under NEPA.128  To reach this issue, the court 
first had to determine whether emissions from the proposed Mexican 
power plants were properly within the scope of environmental review,129 
as NEPA only applies to projects that are “subject to [federal] control and 
responsibility.”130  The court concluded that they were properly excluded 
from the scope of the proposed federal action for NEPA purposes 
because the proposed power plants were outside of the jurisdiction of 
the United States.131  The court went on to conclude, however, that 
emissions from the plants could be considered as indirect or “cumulative 
impact[s]” of the proposed federal action and, therefore, should have 
been addressed in the EAs for the project.132 
The court’s discussion in Border Power I of the potential 
environmental impacts of power plant carbon dioxide emissions on 
climate change was cursory at best.  The court simply noted that:  (1) 
“[t]he record shows that carbon dioxide is one of the pollutants emitted 
by a natural gas turbine and that it is a [GHG]”; (2) emissions from the 
turbines to be used at the proposed power plants in Mexico “have 
potential environmental impacts”; and (3) the government’s “failure to 
disclose and analyze [the] significance” of carbon dioxide emissions “is 
counter to NEPA.”133  The DOE subsequently issued an EIS that included 
an evaluation of emissions from the proposed Mexican power facilities 
as part of its analysis of project alternatives, but initial claims attacking 
the document’s cumulative impact analysis were subsequently 
                                                 
128 See id. at 1012. 
129 Id. 
130 10 C.F.R. § 1021.104(b) (2007). 
131 See Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 
132 See id. at 1033.  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily on the Ninth 
Circuit’s decisions in  Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105 
(9th Cir. 2000) and Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1989).  In 
Wetlands Action Network, the court held that agencies are only required to consider impacts 
associated with a non-federal action if the causal linkage between the two is such that the 
non-federal action cannot proceed without the related federal action.  222 F.3d at 1118.  In 
Sylvester, the court held that federal agencies are required to consider the indirect or 
cumulative impacts of a project that is not within the defined scope of a proposed federal 
action, if that project and another project that is within federal jurisdiction constitute “two 
links of a single chain.”  884 F.2d at 400.  The court stated that it is not enough if one project 
might benefit from the other project’s presence.  Id.  The link between the two projects must 
be such that each action could not exist without the other.  Id.  The district court in Border 
Power I concluded that, because one of the proposed Mexican power plants was to be 
constructed solely for the purpose of supplying the U.S. energy grid over the proposed 
transmission line, the two projects were sufficiently linked to require consideration of the 
plant’s emissions under NEPA.  260 F. Supp. 2d at 1017. 
133 Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1028–29. 
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dropped.134  In its final decision, the court did not address the adequacy 
of the EIS’s analysis of potential climate change impacts.135  While Border 
Power I stretched the contours of Lujan standing, another case, decided 
two years later, continued this expansion. 
B. Greater Standing Expansion under Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson 
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson,136 the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California stretched the limits of standing criteria 
articulated in Lujan even further than the Border Power I court had.  The 
plaintiffs were several U.S. cities and an environmental group, who 
brought an action against two quasi-governmental agencies—the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) and the Export-
Import Bank of the United States (“Ex-Im Bank” or “Ex-Im”)—to compel 
the agencies to conduct EAs under NEPA to address the global warming 
impacts of projects supported by the agencies outside of the United 
States.  The plaintiffs claimed that the impacts of global warming on the 
United States’ environment required the agencies to address global 
warming pursuant to NEPA, even though none of the projects supported 
by the agencies were located in the United States.137  By making such an 
assertion, plaintiffs sought to extend NEPA’s environmental review 
requirements to GHG-emitting projects located throughout the world, 
even where the involvement of U.S. governmental agencies is only 
modest. 
The actions challenged in the litigation involved a very limited role 
that OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank play in supporting U.S. business interests 
oversees.  OPIC’s mission is “[t]o mobilize and facilitate the participation 
of United States private capital and skills in the economic and social 
development of less developed countries and areas, and countries in 
                                                 
134 See Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy (“Border Power II”), 467 F. 
Supp. 2d 1040, 1040 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 
135 See id.  Plaintiffs challenged the EIS under NEPA, alleging that the EIS inadequately 
considered project alternatives and mitigation measures and an alleged failure to ensure 
the scientific accuracy of relied upon information; the court, however, rejected these 
challenges in all respects.  Id. at 1044–45. 
136 No. C02-4106JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *35 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005). 
137 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 897–901 (N.D. Cal. 
2007).  The Watson and Mosbacher decisions were part of the same litigation over alleged 
climate change consequences stemming from decisions by OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank.  See 
generally id.; Watson, 2005 WL 2035596.  During the pendency of the litigation, Peter 
Watson, who was named as a defendant in the first case in his capacity as President and 
Chief Executive Officer of OPIC, was replaced by Robert Mosbacher, Jr., who was therefore 
substituted in as a named defendant in the second phase of the litigation.  Compare id. at *1 
(naming Watson as the defendant), with Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (naming 
Mosbacher as the defendant). 
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transition from nonmarket to market economies . . . . ”138  It fulfills that 
mission by providing:  (1) political risk insurance; (2) financing through 
loan guarantees; and (3) direct loans to transactions involving small U.S. 
businesses.139  OPIC has no role in the development or approval of the 
projects for which an applicant might seek insurance or loan guarantees 
to cover the applicant’s risk of project participation.140  While OPIC 
provides financial support for exports from the United States,141 the Ex-
Im Bank provides export credit insurance and “guarantees to 
commercial banks and other financial institutions in connection with 
exports of U.S. capital goods and services, a variety of insurance 
products for short- or medium-term credits, direct loans, and guarantees 
for working capital loans made by commercial banks to U.S. 
exporters.”142 
One example of the role OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank play in 
supporting projects outside the United States, cited repeatedly by the 
parties and the district court, involves an oil pipeline in Chad and 
Cameroon (“Chad-Cameroon Project”) for which both agencies provided 
indirect financial assistance.143  The Chad-Cameroon Project was part of a 
larger development project involving oil fields in Chad and oil-loading 
facilities off of the coast of Cameroon.  Its cost was an estimated $2.2 
billion, and the cost of the larger development project was estimated to 
be $3.5 billion.144  OPIC provided up to $250 million in political risk 
insurance coverage to a subcontractor in the Chad-Cameroon Project that 
supplied oil field drilling and related services.145  The Ex-Im Bank 
separately provided a $200 million loan guarantee to a bank 
participating in the financing of the larger development project, but did 
not provide any direct financing for the Chad-Cameroon Project or the 
component pipeline project.146  The loan guarantee by Ex-Im was 
intended to cover only “‘political risks (primarily war and civil unrest, 
expropriation and transfer risks)’ during the construction of the” Chad-
Cameroon Project and after it “was completed and operati[onal].”147 
                                                 
138 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006). 
139 See id. § 2194. 
140 See Defendant OPIC’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 02–4106). 
141 See 12 U.S.C. § 635 (2006). 
142 See Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 895. 
143 Id. at 896. 
144 Id. at 897. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 898. 
147 Id.  In addition to the Chad-Cameroon Project, the actions challenged by the plaintiffs 
included:  (1) loan guarantees to three mutual funds loaning money to an oil and gas 
development project in eastern Russia; (2) a loan guarantee to U.S. capital market investors 
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Both OPIC and Ex-Im have adopted guidelines requiring 
assessments of the environmental impacts of certain approved 
projects.148  OPIC’s guidelines were adopted pursuant to Section 117 of 
the Foreign Assistance Act.149  Under those guidelines, OPIC is required 
to conduct an [EIA], or an [IEA], or both,” for projects that are “‘likely to 
have significant adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive (e.g. 
irreversible, affect sensitive ecosystems, involve involuntary 
resettlement, etc.), diverse, or unprecedented.’”150  The Ex-Im Bank’s 
environmental review guidelines specifically “‘require adherence to 
[NEPA’s] environmental review procedures’” for long-term project 
financing, loans, and guarantees.151  An environmental review is not 
mandatory for medium-term transactions, credit, and working capital 
guarantees or short-term insurance products.152  OPIC and Ex-Im both 
undertook analyses of the proposed projects at issue in the Watson 
litigation under their respective environmental review guidelines.153 
OPIC and Ex-Im disputed plaintiffs’ standing to challenge their 
various funding decisions, claiming that, with respect to any of the 
projects at issue, plaintiffs could not meet the three criteria for standing 
required under Lujan:  (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) 
redressability.154  The district court, however, found that the plaintiffs 
met all three criteria for standing.155  On the issue of injury in fact, the 
court found that, because plaintiffs’ NEPA challenge raised only 
“procedural issues,” there was no requirement to show that a 
substantive environmental harm was imminent or that the agencies’ 
support of foreign development “project[s] [would] have particular 
environmental effects.”156  Instead, the “[p]laintiffs only” had to show 
                                                                                                             
loaning money to a trust funding an oil and gas-development project in Indonesia; (3) 
guarantees for U.S. companies exporting services and equipment to support a project to 
enhance an existing offshore petroleum complex in Mexico; (4) guarantees for similar 
goods and services to develop oil fields and a small refinery in Venezuela; and (5) 
guarantees to a U.S. bank providing financing for the expansion of a coal-fired power plant 
in China.  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C02–4106JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005). 
148 See Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 893, 895–96. 
149 22 U.S.C. § 2151(p) (2006). 
150 Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 894. 
151 Id. at 896 (alteration in original). 
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 896–97. 
154 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C02–4106JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
155 See id. at *2–4. 
156 Id. at *2 (citing Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 674 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)); see 
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that requiring the plaintiffs to prove that the challenged federal project will have particular 
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“that ‘it [was] reasonably probable that the challenged action [would] 
threaten their concrete interests.’”157 
The court noted that, “[w]hile they concede that the impact of [GHG] 
emissions traceable to projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im are not yet 
known with absolute certainty, [p]laintiffs contend the only uncertainty 
is with respect to how great the consequences will be, and not whether 
there will be any significant consequences.”158  The court listed a number 
of contentions, drawn from a series of one-sided declarations, regarding 
how much carbon dioxide would be emitted by the challenged projects.  
The court stated that GHGs are the major contributor to global warming 
in the twentieth century and further increases in GHG emissions will 
continue to increase global warming with widespread environmental 
impacts.159  The court further asserted that these impacts have and will 
affect areas used and owned by the plaintiffs.160 
On that basis, “[t]he [c]ourt conclude[ed] that [t]he [p]laintiffs’ 
evidence [was] sufficient to demonstrate that it is reasonably probable 
that emissions from the projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im 
supported projects will threaten [p]laintiffs’ concrete interests.”161  The 
court failed to explain, however, which specific “concrete interests” 
were, in fact, being threatened.  The plaintiffs may have had a 
generalized interest in maintaining the stability of the global climate.  
However, it is entirely unclear that such an interest is sufficiently distinct 
from the interests of any other member of the public in order to confer 
standing to challenge agency actions in federal court. 
The district court’s approach to standing in Watson directly conflicts 
with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lujan.  Among other things, the 
district court ignored the fact that Lujan suggested that a close 
geographical or economic nexus between a proposed project and alleged 
injury, while not necessarily determinative, is important when the 
                                                                                                             
environmental effects would essentially be imposing a requirement that the plaintiff 
perform the same environmental investigation that he is attempting, through his suit, to 
compel the agency to undertake).  The irony, of course, is plaintiffs did not need to conduct 
any new environmental analyses to establish standing, since for each of the projects 
challenged by plaintiffs, OPIC and Ex-Im had already performed relevant environmental 
analyses.  Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 896–97.  Had the court taken those analyses into 
account in its assessment of the issue, it would have made the court’s determination that 
standing existed much more problematic. 
157 Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 (citing Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 969–70); 
see City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). 
158 Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *3 (citation omitted). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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character of the injury is a procedural one.162  None of the projects 
considered by the district court in Watson comprise the close geographic 
or economic connection with the plaintiffs’ interests that the Supreme 
Court had in mind in Lujan.  The district court’s approach is, instead, 
similar to Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan, suggesting that a 
procedural injury per se—essentially, a grievance by an environmental 
plaintiff premised solely on the failure of a government agency to follow 
pertinent administrative procedures—is sufficient to establish the injury 
in fact required to confer standing.163  The majority opinion in Lujan, 
written by Justice Scalia, expressly rejected this approach, stating that:  
“We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he 
assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to 
protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis 
of his standing.”164 
More importantly, Lujan directly stated: 
that a plaintiff raising only a generally available 
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his 
and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the 
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more 
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public 
at large—does not state an Article III case or 
controversy.165 
The district court in Watson provided no explanation as to how the 
plaintiffs in that case had been harmed by the global warming impacts of 
the projects at issue in any way that was distinct from harms that 
arguably impacted U.S. citizens generally.  Nor did the court explain 
                                                 
162 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
163 According to Justice Blackmun, “as a general matter, the courts owe substantial 
deference to Congress’ substantive purpose in imposing a certain procedural 
requirement. . . . There is no room for a per se rule or presumption excluding injuries 
labeled ‘procedural’ in nature” as grounds to confer standing to plaintiffs in environmental 
cases.  Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).  Justice 
Blackmun stopped short, however, of suggesting that procedural injuries without some 
connection to a substantive harm, albeit an implicit one, are sufficient in this context.  Id.  
“There may be factual circumstances in which a congressionally imposed procedural 
requirement is so insubstantially connected to the prevention of a substantive harm that it 
cannot be said to work any conceivable injury to an individual litigant.”  Id. 
164 Id. at 573 n.8 (emphasis in original); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & 
Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 396 (2012) (“A court must engage in a fresh analysis of 
traceability and redressability in each case for the specific plaintiffs, specific defendants, 
specific harms alleged, and specific remedies sought.”). 
165 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74. 
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why the relief sought by plaintiffs provided any greater benefits to them 
than it would to any other member of the public.  In the absence of such 
explanation, it is hard to see how the Watson plaintiffs could possibly 
establish a sufficient injury in fact to meet the standards articulated in 
Lujan. 
C. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior,166 
environmental interests challenged a federal leasing program for oil and 
gas development on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) in the Beaufort, 
Bering, and Chukchi Seas off the coast of Alaska.  Petitioners alleged that 
the Department of the Interior failed to consider climate change impacts 
of the program pursuant to NEPA and the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (“OCSLA”).167  The petitioners also alleged that the program 
violated NEPA and OCSLA because the government did not conduct 
sufficient baseline research for the affected Alaskan seas.168 
The petitioners advanced two theories of standing, one substantive 
and the other procedural.169  Under the substantive theory, the 
petitioners relied on Massachusetts v. EPA to argue for standing on the 
basis that the government’s “approval of the [p]rogram brings about 
climate change, which in turn adversely affects the species and 
ecosystems of those OCS areas, thereby threatening [p]etitioners’ 
enjoyment of the OCS areas and their inhabitants.”170  The court rejected 
this approach, noting that, unlike the situation in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
there was no sovereign like Massachusetts worthy of “‘special 
solicitude’” for standing purposes.171  More importantly, however, the 
court emphasized that the petitioners had not shown the kind of 
particularized injury that Massachusetts had claimed.  As the court 
observed: 
With respect to Massachusetts’s injury, the Court found 
that Massachusetts “owns a substantial portion of the 
state’s coastal property” that had already been harmed 
by the EPA’s inaction, and that the EPA’s failure to 
                                                 
166 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
167 Id. at 471. 
168 Id. at 472.  The appellate court dismissed the plaintiff-petitioners’ NEPA and ESA 
claims for lack of ripeness, but concluded that their OCSLA-based challenges were all 
justiciable.  Id. 
169 Id. at 475. 
170 Id. at 476. 
171 Id. at 476–77. 
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regulate these gases would cause additional harm to its 
shoreline.  Though the Court found that the risks of 
climate change were widely shared because global sea 
levels had already begun to rise, it nevertheless 
concluded that Massachusetts had shown a sufficiently 
particularized injury because Massachusetts had alleged 
that its particular shoreline had actually been 
diminished by the effects of climate change.  In other 
words, by showing that climate change had diminished 
part of its own shoreline, Massachusetts itself had 
shown that it had been affected “in a personal and 
individual way” by the EPA’s failure to regulate 
greenhouse gases.172 
By contrast, the court found that none of the petitioners in the 
present case alleged that the government’s actions would cause 
individual harm; instead, they relied solely on the effects that the 
government’s actions would have on the climate in general.173  The court 
concluded that, as a result, the “[p]etitioners’ substantive theory of 
standing fails because [p]etitioners have not established either the injury 
or causation element of standing.”174  However, the court found that the 
petitioners did have standing based on their procedural theory.  The 
court noted that, “a plaintiff may have standing if it can show that an 
agency failed to abide by a procedural requirement that was ‘designed to 
                                                 
172 Id. at 476 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
n.1 (1992)). 
173 Id.  On the issue of causation, the court focused on the fact that linking the 
government’s actions to any alleged injury required numerous assumptions involving the 
behavior of others not involved in the litigation, stating that: 
[T]o reach the conclusion that [p]etitioners are injured because of [the 
government’s] alleged failure to consider the effects of climate change 
with respect to the Leasing Program, [p]etitioners must argue that:  
adoption of the Leasing Program will bring about drilling; drilling, in 
turn, will bring about more oil; this oil will be consumed; the 
consumption of this oil will result in additional carbon dioxide being 
dispersed into the air; this carbon dioxide will consequently cause 
climate change; this climate change will adversely affect the animals 
and their habitat; therefore [p]etitioners are injured by the adverse 
effects on the animals they enjoy.  Such a causal chain cannot 
adequately establish causation because [p]etitioners rely on the 
speculation that various different groups of actors not present in this 
case—namely, oil companies, individuals using oil in their cars, cars 
actually dispersing carbon dioxide—might act in a certain way in the 
future. 
Id. at 478–79. 
174 Id. at 478. 
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protect some threatened concrete interest’ of the plaintiff.’”175  Under this 
theory, “‘a procedural-rights plaintiff must show not only that the 
defendant’s acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that it is 
substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the essential 
injury to the plaintiff’s own interest.’”176 
The court concluded that the petitioners could rely on this theory to 
bring both their OCSLA-based and NEPA-based climate change claims 
because they had demonstrated “that they possess[ed] a threatened 
particularized interest, namely their enjoyment of the indigenous 
animals of the Alaskan areas listed in the Leasing Program.”177  The court 
pointed out that the Supreme Court noted in Lujan that “‘the desire to 
use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is 
undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.’”178  However, 
the court made clear that “[t]his interest, however, will not suffice on its 
own ‘without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any 
specification of when’ the plaintiff will be deprived of the opportunity to 
observe the potentially harmed species.”179  The court found that the 
petitioners had met these requirements using affidavits demonstrating 
their “immediate and definite interest in enjoyment of the animals” and 
based on the fact that the government’s “adoption of an irrationally 
based Leasing Program could cause a substantial increase in the risk to 
their enjoyment of the animals affected . . . .”180 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Center for Biological Diversity was decided just a few weeks after the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Summers; thus, the appellate court 
did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s affirmation in Summers 
of the traditional requirements for standing in environmental cases.181  
Nevertheless, of the various cases that have considered standing for 
NEPA purposes in the context of global climate change, it is the court of 
appeals’ decision in that case that comes the closest to “getting it right” 
under the Supreme Court’s consistent approach to standing since Lujan. 
For example, in Border Power I, the fact that the plaintiffs had 
members who lived “near” the proposed transmission lines and 
                                                 
175 Id. at 479 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8). 
176 See id. (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). 
179 Id. (emphasis in original). 
180 Id. 
181 Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior was decided on April 17, 
2009—six weeks after the Summers decision—and oral argument in the case was completed 
some months before that.  563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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associated power facilities, and who shared “a concern for the 
environmental health” of the region, by itself, did not say anything about 
how the failure to adequately analyze those facilities’ GHG emissions 
resulted in an injury that was “actual” or “imminent.”  The plaintiffs 
never demonstrated how they would be injured by global warming, and 
the court did not indicate that it had considered the potential 
contribution to global warming by GHG emissions from the facilities as 
relevant to the plaintiffs’ standing.  Living in close proximity to the site 
of a proposed federal action may impact the magnitude of a potential 
injury to one’s concrete interests, but that alone should not be enough to 
demonstrate that there is an injury.  Under Monsanto, plaintiffs in Border 
Power I should have been required to show that the GHG emissions 
associated with the proposed project created a “reasonable probability of 
harm” to their interests in the environment—the fact that they were not 
so required should have been fatal to their NEPA standing. 
This is hardly to say that concerns over the impact of GHG emissions 
on climate change can never provide the basis for a challenge to federal 
action under NEPA.  Center for Biological Diversity shows that it can be 
under appropriate circumstances.  Nevertheless, courts should be careful 
to recognize that using NEPA as a litigation strategy may have limited 
value as a weapon in any war on global warming.  After more than a 
quarter century of judicial development, the rules governing standing 
under NEPA and other federal environmental laws are well established, 
and they necessarily focus on relatively localized impacts from domestic 
projects, which have a substantial federal connection with the United 
States.  Those rules are not intended to apply to highly-generalized 
impacts associated with a global phenomenon like climate change, 
caused by activities diffusely spread across the planet.  In the case of 
agency actions, like those considered in Watson, a requirement to prepare 
detailed environmental impact studies under NEPA will not reduce 
global warming in any appreciable way. 
The stage for an approach to regulate GHG emissions under the 
CAA has now been set with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.182  Whether and to what extent that more rational 
approach is supported by our nation’s policy makers remains to be seen. 
                                                 
182 Now effectively confirmed by the Court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).  Some commentators argue GHG emission regulation will occur 
through Supreme Court decisions like Massasschusets v. EPA and Connectiuct v. American 
Electric Power Co. because of Congressional deadlock.  See Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role 
in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulations:  Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 
VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 447 (2012). 
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